Which reform is most important? - some evidence from New Zealand by Mark Prebble
Which Reform Is Most  
Important? - Some Evidence 
from New Zealand 
 
Mark Prebble 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper 12/03 
 
 2012 
 
 
 
 
INSTITUTE FOR GOVERNANCE 
AND POLICY STUDIES  
 WORKING PAPER 
12/01 
 
 
MONTH/YEAR 
 
  AUTHOR 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INSTITUTE FOR GOVERNANCE 
AND POLICY STUDIES  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCLAIMER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2012 
  
Mark Prebble 
prebblemark@gmail.com 
 
 
The author is grateful to Vance Kerslake for advice 
on use and interpretation of citizen surveys and for 
information about the Kiwis Count survey. He is 
also  grateful to him and to John Yeabsley for  
reading and commenting on a draft of this paper. 
This paper was originally delivered at a conference 
on Public Sector Reform in Beijing in May 2012;  
Mark thanks the Chinese University of Politics and 
Law and the New Zealand Contemporary 
China Research Centre at Victoria University of 
Wellington for organising and facilitating  
participation at the conference.  This paper has 
been published in Chinese Public Administration 
(September 2012, pp93-99), and is republished in 
English here. 
 
 
School of Government 
Victoria University of Wellington 
PO Box 600 
Wellington 
NEW ZEALAND 
 
 
For any queries relating to this working paper 
please contact  berys.cuncannon@vuw.ac.nz 
 
 
 
 
 
The views, opinions, findings, and conclusions or 
recommendations expressed in this paper are 
strictly those of the author. They do not  
necessarily reflect the views of the Institute for  
Governance and Policy Studies, the School of  
Government or Victoria University of Wellington.  
Which Reform Is Most Important? - Some Evidence from New Zealand 
 
 
Mark Prebble 
Senior Associate 
Institute for Governance and Policy Studies 
School of Government 
Victoria University of Wellington 
 
 
Abstract 
In public administration circles there are two widely accepted stylised facts about New Zealand.  
First, New Zealand implemented sweeping public sector reforms and was at the forefront of the New 
Public Management movement.  Second, New Zealand scores very well on several international 
league tables measuring the quality of government.  This paper considers possible connections 
between these stylised facts by looking at reforms of financial management, institutional structures, 
information management and appointment processes in New Zealand.  Recent data from the 
government-commissioned “Kiwis Count” surveys is used to identify which aspects of government 
performance are most important to New Zealanders.  It seems that though most commentators have 
focused on finance and institutional reforms, earlier reforms involving open information, non-political 
appointments and public accountability are more significant to New Zealanders. 
 
Introduction 
New Zealand offers an interesting case study for anyone interested in public sector reform.1  During 
a brief period from 1986 to 1994 there were extensive changes to government administration in 
New Zealand.  These included restructuring many departments, reorganising public employment and 
contracting out some activities, redesigning the system of public finance, and corporatizing a 
significant part of the public sector, including privatising some agencies.   
However, though it is easy to see that much has changed in public administration in New Zealand, it 
is harder to assess whether the changes were beneficial, or which changes were the most successful.  
This paper outlines an approach to considering which reforms may have been the most valuable for 
New Zealanders. 
There has been considerable academic debate about the reforms.  Among New Zealand 
commentators some economists have offered strong endorsement (Evans et al 1996) and some 
                                                             
1 This paper is the English language version of an article in Chinese Public Administration (2012, 8, pp.93-99). 
The paper was originally presented at a conference on “Public Services Reform” in Beijing during 19-20 May 
2012. I am grateful to Vance Kerslake for advice on use and interpretation of citizen surveys and for 
information about the Kiwis Count survey.  I am also grateful to him and to John Yeabsley for reading and 
commenting on a draft of this paper.  
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from other disciplines have been scathing in their rejection of a perceived ideological agenda 
(Kelsey, 1997) or have deplored the appearance of an “enterprise culture” in the public sector 
(Mascarenhas 2003, p 144).  Insiders have offered a comprehensive defence (Scott et al, 1990, Scott, 
2001) while other observers have provided a detailed analysis (Boston et al, 1996) or critique 
(Gregory, 1995).   
International commentators have also been interested.  Some have seen New Zealand’s reforms as 
part of an international pendulum as fashion in public administration moves between ideas (Aucoin, 
1990).  Others have seen New Zealand at the forefront of a new approach to public management 
(Lynn 2005, p27); some (including Hood 2005, p11) have emphasised the significance of New 
Zealand government documents underpinning the new approach (New Zealand Treasury 1987) as a 
precursor of “new public management.”  Critics have suggested that the reforms may have been too 
mechanically focussed on contracting at the expense of good management (Schick, 1996) or that the 
strengths of the New Zealand reforms may have been over-sold (“hyperbole”, Rubin and Kelly 2005, 
p568). 
More recently, reports prepared by New Zealand officials have identified problems flowing from an 
excessive focus on the efficiency of individual departments and some practices have been reversed 
in order to restore a more “whole-of-government” approach (Wintringham et al 2001, Wevers, 
2011).  Observers have also noted that thinking in New Zealand (and elsewhere) has moved on so 
that we are now in a “post-new public management” world (Lindquist, 2011). 
This range of views demonstrates that any assertion about the value of a reform may be open to 
challenge.  This debate is to be expected since most analyses have focussed on the reforms, their 
intentions, their intellectual underpinnings and their implementation, assessing the reforms against 
various criteria that seem important to individual commentators.  This paper takes a different 
approach.  Without rejecting the usefulness of expert analyses of government reforms, this paper 
suggests that any comprehensive assessment should also include some understanding of what is 
valuable to New Zealanders.   
Changes in public policies tend to be justified as a means to enhance the public interest; I suggest 
that an assessment of the public interest should include some understanding of the attitudes and 
preferences of New Zealanders.  Accordingly the aim is to construct a method of analysis to address 
the question of which reforms are (more) aligned with the preferences of New Zealanders about 
how they are governed.   
This paper does not include an overview of reform in New Zealand, nor does it provide an 
assessment of which reforms were successful; it is aimed at the narrower question of whether public 
attitudes can be used to inform assessments of which reforms have improved the public interest.  
That requires clarity about concepts of the public interest and about the public’s views of the 
government; a method to measure public attitudes; and a mapping of attitudes onto different types 
of reforms.  The following section briefly canvasses questions of public interest, to locate this 
contribution within theoretical discourse.  The next section discusses issues of the use and 
interpretation of citizen surveys.  The following section describes the results of recent surveys in 
New Zealand and the final section considers the implications of those results for assessing reforms in 
New Zealand. 
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Public Interest and the Views of the Public and Trust in Government 
Public interest is a contested concept; some would say it is an empty concept.  Bozeman (2007) 
points out that public-interest theory has been unfashionable in recent decades and he has balanced 
that with a useful recent approach to understand concepts of public interest (and the related idea of 
public value).  This paper adopts his definition of the public interest as “the outcomes best serving 
the long-run survival and well-being of a social collective construed as a public” (p12).  However, that 
definition leaves room for many views on what constitutes the public interest, or whether it exists at 
all. 
Cochran (1974) contains a useful taxonomy of theories of public interest.  Some (“abolitionists” in 
Cochran’s terminology) reject the concept altogether; they see no public interest, simply the politics 
of competing private interests.  This idea is not the recent invention of public choice theorists; 
Cochran traces it back to Arthur Bentley’s efforts to introduce a scientific approach to the study of 
politics in the early 20th century (Cochran 1974, p332).  I am not following the abolitionist approach; 
as a former public official I find it an excessively cynical approach to the use of authority by the 
government in a democratic country. 
Among those who recognise some public interest Cochran distinguishes a “normative” group. 
Normative analysts do not concern themselves with the preferences of the public; instead they use 
lists of criteria with which to assess policy proposals.  The more a proposition is seen to contribute to 
the criteria, the more it is understood to improve public value.  This approach sees reforms assessed 
in terms of their ability to contribute to efficiency, democratic responsiveness, accountability, 
distributional equity, or other criteria that are considered to be important.  As a general rule the 
studies cited in the introduction all tend to follow the normative approach.  However, that may not 
reflect a deliberate decision by the various authors on the assessment of public interest, so much as 
a lack of data on the views of the public.  
Cochran identifies two other approaches to public value or public interest which involve various 
degrees of emphasis on the views of people in society; these are either a “consensual” or “process” 
approach to public value.  Under the consensual approach a changing conception of public value is 
identified through discourse, whereas process theories emphasise the importance of using proper 
decision procedures to ensure views can be contributed.  Both of these are based in a democratic 
approach to public administration and hold that the views of people must be considered to some 
degree in any assessment of public value.   
These distinctions suggest that there is some contention about whether public preferences should 
be considered in any analysis of the public value of reforms.  For the consensual (and process) 
approaches it is self-evident that citizens’ views should be considered, since the views held by 
people are intrinsically valuable.  But for an expert/norm-referenced approach the views of citizens 
may seem irrelevant.  I disagree with that expert orientation and prefer a simple norm-based 
approach as follows.  First, effective administration depends on the legitimacy (of government) in 
the eyes of citizens.  Second, legitimacy is influenced by the views of citizens on the design and 
delivery of government activity.  Third, trust in public institutions as voiced by citizens is a proxy 
which can be used to assess this aspect of the legitimacy of government.  That is, public views are 
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relevant in the assessment of public institutions (and reforms), either because the views of the 
public are intrinsically important, or because trust in public sector institutions is instrumentally 
important as a component of the legitimacy (and therefore the effectiveness) of government.    
Like other terms in this area, “trust” can be elusive.  It is not even beyond dispute that improving 
levels of trust are always preferable.  For example, Bouckaert and Van der Walle say: 
“Most research focussing on Western Europe regards trust in government as indispensable 
for government to function.  In Anglo-Saxon research, however, low trust is often regarded 
as an expression of a healthy democratic attitude, since high levels of trust may facilitate 
repressive government” (2003, p333).   
They also point out that the understanding of what is implied by trust in government is changing as 
public expectations change: 
“Where trust in government used to refer to the belief that government will not become 
autocratic or allow people to be arrested unjustly, it now refers to more down to earth 
matters such as the reliability of service or the expectation that policy will correspond to 
one’s wishes” (2003, p334). 
However, even for a small-government Anglo-Saxon it is hard to ignore the role of the government 
as the sole power able to use coercion to maintain public order, or the importance that the 
government behave in a trustworthy way and that the public perceive the government to be 
trustworthy.  Whether we are considering civil rights or civic services people’s support for 
government activities (and therefore the effectiveness of those activities) is likely to be enhanced if 
the public trust the government. 
The view that legitimacy (or trust) is important is widely asserted in government; for example the 
present leader of the New Zealand state services recently said: 
“One of New Zealand’s greatest assets is the trust people have in our public institutions” 
(Rennie 2011, p6). 
In effect, the assertion is that people who mistrust the government are more likely to defy edicts 
and less likely to comply with their obligations.   
“Absence of trust in government results in citizens who do not want to pay taxes, who do 
not obey the law, etc. and makes necessary an increase in the number of monitoring and 
enforcement systems” (Bouckaert and Van der Walle 2007, p340). 
 “Trust in government” means that people believe that the government will do what it says it will do 
to the point that they act in reliance on that belief.  The government could force people to obey 
because it has the power of coercion, but trust in government reduces the need to use force.  Over 
time, as people see a government that meets its undertakings and refrains from unreasonable force, 
they develop enough confidence to rely on the expectation that the government will continue to be 
honest and effective; that is, they trust the government and the government works better as a 
result.  Several aspects may contribute to trust in government; one of them is trust in the institutions 
of the government system. 
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 That is, when deciding whether to consider the views of people in assessing the public interest there 
are grounds to do so either because of the intrinsic importance of their views (process/consensual 
approaches) or because of the instrumental value of their views as they contribute to the 
effectiveness of government (a normative approach). For the purposes of this paper it is sufficient to 
assert that citizens’ views are significant.  There are other matters that also matter; efficiency, 
integrity, farness, democratic accountability and other factors are all valuable.  I am not aiming to 
develop a theory of public value; nor am I attempting a complete review of New Zealand’s public 
reforms.  For my purpose it is enough to suggest that the views of members the public on the 
trustworthiness of the government can usefully be included in assessing public value in general, and 
in considering the relative value of different reforms.   
However, it is a big step to move from accepting that levels of trust are important to deciding that 
some measure of trust might be useful in assessing reforms.  The next section considers some of the 
issues in bridging the divide from theory to measurement.   
 
Measuring Trust and the Approach to Policy 
If the concept of trust is elusive, measuring it may be even more difficult.  Pundits often pronounce 
on the public’s views, but their sources may be restricted to a small coterie or even their own heads.  
I suggest that any claim to assess levels of public trust must involve some process of asking the 
public, but that needs to be done with due care.   
Citizen surveys have been used in many countries in recent decades.  Many public managers, 
encouraged by marketing consultants, have used public satisfaction as a measure of the quality of 
their work.  However, in academic circles questions remain.  The following paragraphs discuss the 
major issues that must be considered before public opinion data could be used to consider the 
merits of policies.  These issues are: conceptual, relating to the role of people and the state; 
analytical, relating to issues of attribution and interpretation of results; and methodological, relating 
to getting a representative sample.  These are discussed in turn. 
Concepts of People and the State 
Where satisfaction surveys are translated from a commercial to a public context there are 
immediate issues.  Using a market-based technique in a government context suggests that people 
who interact with the government are in a relationship similar to those who interact as willing 
buyers and sellers.  This is like talking of those who interact with government agencies as 
“customers.”  The issue here is not simply a matter of survey design or reporting; the major concern 
is that a market-based view of satisfaction may distort the approach that public managers take to 
delivering services.  If those who commission surveys move to adopt private sector responses in 
order to improve their survey results they may create problems, because the new practices may be 
inappropriate in a context of obligations (Law and Urry, 2004). 
This problem partly stems from careless use of terminology.  The issue is clarified if roles are 
distinguished more clearly, as suggested by Alford (2001).  He suggests that the term “customer” 
should be restricted to cases where a willing buyer is trading with a willing (government or privately 
owned) seller for full value.  Those who receive some kind of free or discounted service from the 
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government should be referred to as “beneficiaries”.  Those who are required to comply with some 
government prescription (including paying taxes) should be called “obligatees.”  And when people 
are considering their assessment of the government in-the-round (perhaps with a view to voting), 
they are described as citizens. 
I suggest it may also be helpful to keep Alford’s distinctions in mind in interpreting survey results 
(see the section on interpretation, below). 
Attribution: The Link between Government Actions and Trust. 
An assumption that improved government services leads inevitably to improved levels of trust 
requires substantiation.  In fact trust may be influenced by mood, political scandals, economic cycles 
or many other social or psychological factors (Bouckaert and Van der Walle 2003, p335).  Rather 
than simply asking whether individuals trust the government it is necessary to also enquire about 
what aspects of government lead to improving levels of trust (Bouckaert and Van der Walle 2003, 
p332).  And it is inadequate to take the respondent’s priorities without test; it is preferable to use 
regression techniques to see which factors of government performance are linked to improved 
overall assessment (Van Ryzin and Immerwahr 2007, p216).  The resulting measures of derived 
importance are sometimes referred to as “drivers”; that is, they identify the factors that are believed 
to drive the public’s level of trust in government. 
However, even with that level of care, it is important not to overstate the case.  It is an ambitious 
assertion to claim that regression demonstrates causality; correlation is the best that can be 
asserted with confidence (Bruning 2011, Howard 2011b, p94). 
Interpretation: The Difference between Broad Perceptions and Specific Observations 
Many surveys of performance in government ask about general perceptions of government before 
focusing more tightly on specific recent experiences of government services.  It is commonly 
reported that broad perceptions are less favourable than specific memories (Erin Research 2008, 
p16, Phase 5 Consulting 2005, p13).  The question is how to interpret that pattern? 
One explanation is that when people are asked for broad perceptions they revert to stereotypes and 
rumour, but when asked about particular events they rely on truer memories.  Howard (2011a, p75) 
claims that interpretation “assumes that citizens are unable to think critically for themselves” and 
says that calls into question the whole approach; if citizens cannot think critically, why would we ask 
them for their opinions at all?  
An alternative explanation links to Alford’s citizen/beneficiary/obligatee terminology.  A general 
question about perceptions of government, especially about trust in government, may tend to 
encourage the respondent to think as a citizen (rather than as a beneficiary).  In that context, they 
may think about services they do not agree with as much as they think of those they support.  In any 
society where the citizens have heterogeneous views some of the respondents will not be in favour 
of some of the activities of the government.  In addition, there will be other services which may be 
of less current interest to some citizens (perhaps because of life-cycle reasons), and there will be 
others which loom only as obligations.  Taken in the round, it is likely that citizens will be less 
positive about the government in general than they would be when considering activities they have 
accessed, even if some of those were obligatory.   
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Methodology: Representative Samples. 
A final issue is achieving a sample which is sufficiently representative of the population.  A large 
sample can always be achieved by spending enough money and taking enough time.  Various sub-
groups (age-groups or ethnic groups) can be over-sampled to achieve groups that are large enough 
for analysis, and weighting can be used to arrive at a representative group.  However, poor response 
rates can be fatal. 
For example, the Canadian Citizen First surveys have a well-deserved reputation for analytical rigour, 
but they suffer from persistent problems with response rates.  According to Howard (2011a, pp70-
71) response rates in Citizen First surveys have oscillated between 9 and 15 per cent.  Arithmetically, 
a response rate of 10 per cent means that a 50 per cent response to a yes/no question could 
represent anything between 5 per cent and 95 per cent agreement in the total population (Howard 
2011a, p71).  Response rates that low seriously undermine the ability to assert a connection 
between apparent drivers and actual levels of trust in public institutions. 
Criteria for Measurement. 
Taking the previous paragraphs as whole suggests a set of criteria that should be considered when 
assessing different data sources as a possible measure of trust in government, and what policies or 
reforms are likely to boost trust in government.  Those criteria are: A clear concept of the role of 
citizens (including the difference between beneficiaries and obligatees); evidence on what types of 
government action will enhance trust; clarity on the difference between responses as a citizen (to 
broad questions) versus responses as a user (beneficiary/obligatee); and a representative sample 
with a reasonable response rate. 
The next section considers a range of measures that are available in New Zealand against those 
criteria. 
 
Perceptions of Government and Government Programmes 
Though the studies listed in the introduction have generally assessed reforms with little information 
on the views of the public, some international organisations have drawn on wider views to assess 
the performance of governments.  Assessing government performance is not straightforward.  For 
example, the OECD has conducted a multi-year programme to construct Government at a Glance 
(OECD, 2007 and Lonti and Woods, 2008); after that work their “glance” requires the reader to take 
in 58 data sets of data to assess  government performance in each country (OECD, 2011).  However, 
a number of institutions have collected perspectives in many countries to prepare comparative 
results-based analyses.  Some recent assessments of that type suggest that something is working 
well in the New Zealand Government.  Those results seem to be evidence of some support for (and 
trust in) government institutions.   
For example, the World Bank’s assessment of governments’ regulation of commerce places New 
Zealand third (of 183 economies) in the world (World Bank, 2012, p116).  The World Economic 
Forum places New Zealand first (of 142 countries) for its control of public funds, avoidance of bribery 
and for judicial independence (Schwab 2011, p277).  Transparency International places New Zealand 
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first (of 182 countries) in its Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International 2011).  These 
results are commonly relied on in New Zealand Government reports as evidence of some degree of 
success (Rennie 2011, p27).   
However, these surveys do not rate well against the criteria in this paper.  The data in these studies 
is neither independent nor broad-based.  The World Economic Forum relies on the World Bank 
report for much of their data in this area (Schwab, p521).  Transparency International also uses 
World Bank data, modified by the inclusion of some other sources, but those extra sources rely on 
responses from a small number of experts; it seems that around a third of the assessments that 
influence the Corruptions Perceptions Index are supplied by two people (Ignite Consultants 2011, 
p10).  The World Bank report (and therefore the World Economic Forum report) on New Zealand is 
itself based on inputs from just 40 people over half of whom are lawyers and a quarter public 
servants (World Bank 2012, p181); this may not be an unbiased source, and certainly cannot claim to 
be a representative sample. 
A more recent series, the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index places New Zealand first for 
absence of corruption, second for open government and the limitation of government powers and 
third for regulatory enforcement and effective criminal justice (Agrast et al, 2011, p82).  This study 
also used experts, but it supplemented that with surveys of some 66000 people around the world 
(Agrast et al, 2011, p7).  That is more reassuring than the other indices as a reflection of the views of 
the public, and suggests that something may be working well in the New Zealand Government 
system, but it is not sufficient to point to which types of reform are more conducive to promoting 
trust as no attempt was made to explore the links.  That is, the large samples used in the Rule of law 
Index provide some guarantee that the views are representative, but in the absence of more work 
they do not show which policies or practices contributed to New Zealand’s high rating. 
The only study I am aware of that examines levels of trust and the drivers of trust is the Kiwis Count 
survey.  This is administered by the State Services Commission; two surveys have been completed 
and published, one in 2007 (SSC 2008) and the second survey in 2009 (SSC 2010a).  These are based 
on the Canadian Citizens First methodology (Erin Research, 2008), which includes an examination of 
drivers as well as levels of perceived satisfaction with public services.  The Canadians have spent a 
decade improving service performance, and the New Zealand results for the perceived quality of 
service are already comparable to the levels recently achieved in Canada. As with the other surveys 
this suggests New Zealand is doing something right.  
As with other satisfaction surveys Kiwis Count reports a difference between broad perceptions of 
satisfaction with the government and reported recent dealings with the government.  New 
Zealanders report higher levels of satisfaction on average as a result of their recent dealings with 
government agencies than they report for dealing with commercial entities (quality scores of 69 
versus 65 respectively, SSC 2010b p46).  However, when asked their general perception of dealing 
with the public sector or the private sector only 14 per cent thought public agencies provide better 
service and 41 per cent disagreed (SSC2010b, p45).   
The survey reports make no attempt to explain these discrepancies between reported and perceived 
satisfaction, but an account based on the difference between beneficiaries and obligatees may 
assist.  Data supplied by the SSC (SSC data 2012) shows that those who used a government service 
that they saw as mandatory were less satisfied than those who used a voluntary service (67.5 service 
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score versus 70 respectively).  But in total only 30 per cent of the reported interactions were 
described as mandatory versus 54 per cent that were seen as voluntary.  Perhaps when asked to 
think about the government in general many New Zealanders think about their obligations to the 
government and the services that they do not value.  This is consistent with an earlier New Zealand 
study which found that “the citizen relationship with the government is a reluctant one” (Yeabsley 
and Bailey 2001, p6).  If so, it is not surprising that the perception result would be less favourable 
than reported experiences which are dominated by voluntary interaction with the government.  
The survey is representative.  It is run as a postal survey using names drawn from the electoral 
register.  The response rate was 61 per cent in 2007 and 56 per cent in 2009 (SSC 2010b, p73).  On 
the other hand, the initial survey of the drivers of satisfaction and trust did not have such a strong 
response rate.  It was conducted as a telephone poll in 2007 before the first Kiwis Count survey and 
achieved a response rate of only 26.6 per cent for the main sample (Colmar Brunton 2007, p20).  
However, there are several balancing points that suggest the estimates of drivers are robust.  First, 
the drivers have been retested and confirmed in both of the main surveys.  Second, the drivers were 
explored in a series of focus group sessions; these discussions did not raise doubts about the 
methodology or results of the drivers survey (UMR Research, 2008).  Third, the drivers of satisfaction 
(but not trust) have been further tested in surveys by individual departments in New Zealand: these 
have all produced closely similar results to those found by the 2007 drivers survey (SSC 2010b, p9).  
These results suggest the estimated drivers of satisfaction are robust and stable, and there is no 
reason to suspect the same will not apply to the drivers of trust. 
Unlike the Canadian survey, the New Zealand survey specifically asks respondents “Overall, to what 
extent do you trust the public service?” (SSC 2010b, p88).  On balance New Zealanders report that 
they trust the public service (33% at 4 or 5 on a five point scale, versus 19% at 1 or 2 on the scale), 
but many have no strong view (48% at 3 on the scale) (SSC 2010b, p48).  Though this is not a ringing 
endorsement it is a positive result, and it is an improvement on the result in 2007 (SSC 2010a, p10).  
Because others have not used a similar question international comparisons are not available.   
The survey report raises an issue of attribution with its assertion that New Zealanders’ trust in the 
public service is “strongly influenced by media reports and anecdotal accounts as well as 
stereotypes” (SSC 2010a, p32).  However, the data does not support that view.  In the drivers survey 
respondents agreed that there was a lot of negative publicity and comment (Colmar Brunton 2007, 
p27), but when tested against other influences this did not emerge as a driver of the public’s views 
of trust.  Instead, the drivers of trust in the public service, with their respective explanatory powers 
are (Colmar Brunton 2007, p31): 
1. You have confidence that public servants do a good job (38%); 
2. The public service provides services that meet your needs (18%); 
3. Public servants treat people fairly (15%); 
4. The public service keeps its promises – that is it does what it says it will do (14%); and 
5. The public service admits responsibility when it makes mistakes (14%). 
Between them these five drivers (out of 15 factors that were tested) account for 57 per cent of the 
variation in trust ratings provided by New Zealanders (Colmar Brunton 2007, p31). 
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The previous paragraphs suggest that the Kiwis Count survey passes the tests as a usable measure of 
trust in the public sector in New Zealand and of the factors that influence New Zealanders.  The 
drivers, therefore, are an appropriate basis for considering the value of public sector reforms from 
the point of view of New Zealanders.  The next section considers past reforms to see how they rate 
relative to these drivers of trust. 
 
Assessing Reforms against the Drivers of Trust 
There is no means of directly applying the drivers of trust to a list of reforms and establishing some 
index of compliance to demonstrate direct connections from one to the other.  Instead a more 
qualitative approach is needed.  First, the drivers can be studied to identify the types of reform that 
are more likely to enhance trust; this is based on the focus groups that were used in the study on 
Understanding the Drivers (UMR Research, 2008).  Second, some of the major reforms are 
considered in turn to see which ones appear likely to enhance trust in government. 
A repeated theme in the focus groups was that New Zealanders interpreted the drivers of trust in 
personal terms, and emphasised the quality of their interactions with individual public servants.  
Instead of talking about the public service as an abstraction the focus groups discussed issues like 
helpfulness, empathy, listening skills, knowledge and experience (UMR 2008, p97).  They were aware 
of the constraints on public servants working in large organisations, and saw staff as individuals 
bringing their own attitudes and commitment to the job.  Typical focus group comments included: 
I think some are really caring.  They really do try to do their best. Others think “to hell with 
it,” they are having a bad day (UMR 2008, p99). 
Within reason… they can’t do everything.  Be honest if you don’t know the answer… [Say] I 
will get back to you and actually get back to you (UMR 2008, p103). 
Apologise, acknowledge that they have done wrong and ensure that they will endeavour it 
does not happen again (UMR 2008, p113). 
They need to be knowledgeable and efficient, they need to be flexible and have some 
discretion without the need for a parliamentary enquiry as to why they have made that 
particular decision (UMR 2008, p108). 
It is like you do feel a bit cared for… it keeps the humanity side of things going as far as 
government departments go (UMR 2008, p109). 
The public servant when they do their job, they are acting in the name of the public service… 
really that is the whole service making that mistake (UMR 2008, p115). 
It’s an up-hill battle for the government because as soon as you say “government” people go 
“ohhh” because there’s this preconception… as soon as I think government service I think 
dissatisfied (UMR 2008, p121). 
The public service is not corrupt… The New Zealand Public Service for all its faults and the 
whingeing they have done is in that regard pretty clean I feel (UMR 2008, p131). 
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There are clear themes.  New Zealanders trust in the public service appears to be influenced by the 
behaviour of the public servants they meet and the extent to which they see a culture of service, 
flexibility, openness and probity.  Reforms can therefore be examined to see how much they were 
likely to promote appropriate behaviours and culture. 
In that context, the five drivers can be loosely re-organised and summarised into two tests to see 
whether reforms have tended to promote a culture of:   
 Service to the public (drivers 1, 2 and aspects of 3); and 
 Openness in the conduct of public activities (drivers 4, 5 and aspects of 3). 
As with any brief categorisation it is simplistic to claim that New Zealander’s trust in the public sector 
depend on a culture of service and openness, but the two ideas capture the essential elements and 
will serve for this paper.  The next step is to apply those tests to New Zealand’s reforms. 
In the 1980s and 1990s there were many policy changes with significant implications for those 
involved.  However, even if they each achieved the results that were intended, it is less clear that 
they improved service or openness.  A full consideration would require a detailed examination of 
each policy change.  This exercise is more limited, focusing on major areas of change.  They are 
considered in turn. 
Corporatisation (and Privatisation):  The main effect of the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 was to 
move many activities that had been conducted as part of the government into separate commercial 
structures.  Some of those have since been sold.  A major rationale for the shift was to improve 
efficiency by subjecting the organisations to more competitive pressure and by allowing more 
flexibility to follow commercial practices in the use of assets.  That goal appears to have been met in 
some instances, but not all (Duncan and Bollard, 1992).  However, that does not imply that 
corporatisation improved New Zealanders’ trust in the public sector.  There are some means by 
which that could have occurred.  For example, if the departments that were corporatized were 
particularly infested with inappropriate behaviour and culture then their removal could have 
improved the average level of trust in the remaining institutions of the government.  However, there 
is no evidence that that was so. 
Financial Management: The Public Finance Act 1989 changed the government’s finances so that 
departments were funded on the basis of the outputs that they were to produce (rather than 
inputs), and budgeting and accounting were shifted from cash accounting to accrual accounting.  
This was a major change leading to more strategic and better informed management and allowing 
more detailed parliamentary scrutiny of performance.  It has probably improved efficiency across 
the government and it has certainly sharpened the focus of senior officials on matters of efficiency 
and performance.  However, it seems that none of those matters feature in the drivers of trust in the 
New Zealand government.  In fact, if tighter financial management has tended to point managers 
towards emphasising production targets rather than the quality of individual interactions with the 
public, that could undermine trust. 
Macroeconomic management: The Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 required the government to 
publish detailed and long-term statistics about its finances.  The Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 
1989 removed the management of monetary policy from direct political oversight and led to much 
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greater clarity in macroeconomic performance and management.  Both have contributed to 
openness in government and therefore may have assisted trust in government.   However, they 
seem a little more distant from the daily lives of New Zealanders than the factors that are generally 
alluded to in the drivers of trust. 
Public Service Re-organisation:  The State Sector Act 1988 removed a set of provisions which 
constituted public servants as a unified service with distinctive employment law.  Instead, every 
public servant is now employed by the head (Chief Executive) of their department.  Chief Executives 
were moved to renewable fixed-term contracts and they are selected and appointed by the 
independent State Services Commissioner (subject to a cabinet veto, which has occurred once since 
1988).  A major motivation behind the Act was to improve the responsiveness and accountability of 
public servants, especially senior officials.  This is consistent with the test of openness. 
Whether that act has improved responsiveness and therefore service to the public is debateable.  It 
could be argued that recent moves requiring departments to work more closely together 
(Wintringham et al 2001 and Wevers 2011) are evidence that the State Sector Act has inhibited the 
kind of flexibility that New Zealanders want to see.  However, there is no evidence that the pre-1988 
provisions, with a more formally united public service, actually led to better joined-up service to the 
public than has been available since 1988.  If there has been a problem attributable to the State 
Sector Act, it may be that, compared to what might have happened in a more unified system, the 
independence of individual departments has tended to reduce the uptake of new opportunities to 
work together as technology has evolved. 
 Accepting responsibility for mistakes, on the other hand, has been enhanced.  It was previously very 
rare for any senior public servant to appear in public to explain the actions of their department.  
Senior officials are now regularly seen on television explaining mishaps and sometimes offering 
public apologies.  To the extent that this is a result of the State Sector Act, it has clearly contributed 
to openness.  It appears from the responses in the Kiwis Count survey that more acceptance of 
responsibility would be welcomed by the public, but the move has been in the right direction. 
Re-organisation of Schools and Hospitals: In the late 1980s school governance was shifted to 
increase local control through Boards of Trustees, elected by parents.  In the early 1990s hospital 
management was shifted into a more corporate governance structure (though half the board 
members are now elected by the public and the rest appointed by the minister).  However, major 
elements are still centralised.  Teachers are employed on terms that are negotiated nationally with 
the Ministry of Education and most hospital workers are also employed under national agreements.  
It is not clear whether governance has affected service, but schools probably are more open than 
they were prior to the change with improved communication to parents.  The health sector is also 
more open with patients.  That is partly a professional response to some tragic cases where medical 
practitioners failed their patients.  However, one public reform contributed to openness in the 
health sector.  The Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994 set up a new independent office to 
handle complaints about health care providers; reports are published regularly. 
1986-1994 Reform as a Whole:  Though the State Sector Act and some of the other reforms seem to 
have contributed to openness and accountability in the public sector (but with some distressing 
lapses, see Gregory 1998), it seems unlikely that they explain the high scores that New Zealand’s 
public system regularly achieves in international surveys.  Other provisions, pre-dating the period of 
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rapid reform, appear to have made a greater contribution.  I nominate three in particular: first, the 
Official Information Act 1982; second, the Public Service Act 1912 (the relevant provisions of which 
are still part of current law); and third is a system of public accountability, starting with the 
appointment of an ombudsman in 1962. 
Freedom of Information: The Official Information Act is New Zealand’s freedom of information law.  
It abolished the previous regime of the Official Secrets Act 1951, so that any information in public 
hands became potentially available to all.  Any New Zealander may request information, and the 
presumption is that it shall be released unless there is good reason why not.  Those who are 
disgruntled at the lack of release may apply to the ombudsmen who order its release if they think it 
justified.  According to the OECD this law is among the most open in the world (OECD 2011).  It is 
now common for the media and opposition politicians to acquire information in response to 
requests and this is regularly published.  More significantly, however, government departments 
regularly publish reports and data of public significance.  There is more that could and should be 
released, but government is very open in New Zealand. 
The Official Information Act created obligations of every public servant; those who hold the 
information are required to respond to requests.  The law now underpins every interaction between 
the public and officials.  It is common for people to ask to see files relating to them.  Officials know 
that that the record will be available for scrutiny.  Prior to the act, and the Ombudsmen legislation, it 
was common for files to contain pejorative references to those using government services.  Now 
that information is open, interactions must be more respectful.  This is not just a law affecting 
journalists and senior officials; it has improved behaviour throughout the government.  This directly 
relates to the drivers of trust, especially those about treating people fairly, keeping promises and 
admitting mistakes. 
Merit-based Employment:  The second major law is the Public Service Act 1912, which introduced 
the merit-based public service; the central provisions of that law are maintained in the State Sector 
Act 1988.  This operates at the top of the public service and also throughout government agencies.  
It is illegal for a minister to seek to intervene in employment matters relating to individual public 
servants.  Similarly, appointments to jobs must be based on merit for that job, not on the political 
connections or opinions of the appointee.  The State Services Commissioner is responsible for 
ensuring that the system operates appropriately.  According to OECD staff, New Zealand has one of 
the least politicised public services in the world, with no political interference in senior 
appointments and a “high aspiration” ethics regime (Matheson et al 2007, p25 and p46). 
The intention of the law is clear.  The opening provision of the State Sector Act 1988 says it aims “to 
ensure that employees in the state services are imbued with the spirit of service to the community” 
(long title, section (a)).  A merit-based system does not guarantee that the public meets officials that 
do a good job or who provide services that the public needs, but it does mean that public managers 
can focus on those matters without considering the politics of every appointment.  Political 
appointees can provide good service and meet the needs of the public, but they must also consider 
political priorities.  A permanent non-partisan service can concentrate on developing staff members 
to provide the service that New Zealanders need. That is its function and it has been the function of 
the public service for 100 years.  The merit-based public service seems more significant as a means 
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of delivering the service that New Zealanders want from the government than the reforms of 1986-
1994. 
Public Accountability: Things go wrong in any system, even the best systems.  Openness and service 
demand that mistakes are identified and fixed, and that these processes are seen to happen.  A 
major step towards that goal was the Parliamentary Commissioner (Ombudsman) Act 1962 which 
set up a new independent role.  Ombudsmen receive complaints from anyone who has a concern 
about how they were treated by an agency of the government.  Ombudsmen investigate and 
recommend solutions; they are not bound by existing policy or precedent, they aim for fairness.  
They report annually to parliament; that means their reports are public.  They are “a valuable outlet 
for bringing an unresponsive bureaucracy to account” (Joseph, 2007, p366).  Sometimes the threat 
of involving the ombudsman can be enough to encourage a more sympathetic response from an 
official. 
Some issues may not involve individual misfortune; instead they raise questions of the efficient use 
of public money or misuse of funds.  Another independent officer, the Auditor-General has the 
power to investigate and report.  This is not a new office; the position was established by the Public 
Revenues Act 1878.  In recent years the role has expanded and the Public Audit Act 2001 established 
the role as an officer of parliament.  The auditor does not wait for complaints; she prepares an 
annual programme of reviews of government finance and management.  Her published reports 
regularly call for improvements in administrative practice; it is then the responsibility of managers to 
decide which changes they make, but they make those choices in the knowledge that the auditor will 
return and comment further on their performance. 
Sometimes public commentary is not enough and a management response is necessary.  The State 
Services Commissioner also has an independent power to conduct investigations.  He publishes his 
reports but, because he is the employer of the heads of government departments, he can follow-up 
his reports with sanctions where necessary.  The process of appearing in public to acknowledge 
mistakes (driver 5) is often a result of pressure applied by the State Services Commissioner. 
Taken together the system of public accountability has strengthened considerably over the 50 years 
since the Ombudsmen were established in 1962.  Through that time public accountability has 
certainly increased openness and it has also encouraged service. 
 
Conclusion 
The reform of public sector agencies is a topic of perennial interest; experts argue forever about 
whether change is required and how it should be managed.  This paper suggests that, as well as the 
views of experts, it is useful to consider the views of the public.  Fundamentally that is because any 
reform ought to be intended to improve the public interest, and in that context the preferences of 
the public are relevant.  That is either because the public’s views are intrinsically interesting or 
because legitimacy of the government is a contributor to effective government, and legitimacy exists 
in the minds of the public. 
For the purpose of this analysis of public sector reforms, trust in the public sector is used as a proxy 
for legitimacy.  There are a number of complications involved in measuring trust and drawing a 
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connection to policy options, but the Kiwis Count survey, and the associated drivers of trust offer a 
useful measure applicable to New Zealand.  In essence, the survey suggests that trust in the public 
sector in New Zealand can be improved by encouraging a culture of service and openness. 
Trust in government seems likely to have been little effected by some of the most-heralded reforms 
of recent decades.  On the other hand, earlier provisions including the Official Information Act 1982, 
the establishment of the Ombudsmen in 1962, and the Public Service Act 1912, have brought in far-
reaching and enduring changes to the culture and behaviour of public servants.  Those systems are 
at the heart of service and openness in New Zealand and therefore they appear to have made a 
major contribution to trust in government in New Zealand.   
This does not mean that other reforms have not been valuable; they each need to be considered on 
their merits according to relevant criteria.  But, whether or not the other reforms have been useful, 
experience in New Zealand suggests that there are major gains to be made in promoting freedom of 
information, a merit-based non-partisan public service and public accountability. 
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